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Abstract
In this paper, we investigate the design of robust and secure transmission in intelligent reflecting surface
(IRS) aided wireless communication systems. In particular, a multi-antenna access point (AP) communi-
cates with a single-antenna legitimate receiver in the presence of multiple single-antenna eavesdroppers,
where the artificial noise (AN) is transmitted to enhance the security performance. Besides, we assume
that the cascaded AP-IRS-user channels are imperfect due to the channel estimation error. To minimize
the transmit power, the beamforming vector at the transmitter, the AN covariance matrix, and the IRS
phase shifts are jointly optimized subject to the outage rate probability constraints under the statistical
cascaded channel state information (CSI) error model that usually models the channel estimation error.
To handle the resulting non-convex optimization problem, we first approximate the outage rate probability
constraints by using the Bernstein-type inequality. Then, we develop a suboptimal algorithm based on
alternating optimization, the penalty-based and semidefinite relaxation methods. Simulation results reveal
that the proposed scheme significantly reduces the transmit power compared to other benchmark schemes.
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2I. INTRODUCTION
The intelligent reflecting surface (IRS) has emerged due to the advancement in metamaterial
techniques, which becomes a promising technology in wireless networks [1]. The IRS, which is also
named as reconfigurable intelligent surface (RIS), comprises a large number of passive elements,
which can reflect the wireless signal with adjustable phase shifts [2] [3]. The IRS has the capability
of reconfiguring the wireless propagation environment between access point (AP) and users in a
favourable way by properly designing the phase shifts. Thus, the IRS can improve the performance
of wireless networks in various aspects. Since the IRS operates in a passive mode by reflecting
incident signals [4], it can significantly improve the spectral and energy efficiency of the wireless
networks. Besides, it is very appealing that the IRS is low-cost, and can be deployed easily on
buildings facades, interior walls, room ceilings, lamp posts and road signs, etc. Therefore, exploiting
the IRS device to assist wireless communication systems has received extensive attentions. The
IRS-aided wireless communication systems in the existing literature include the single-user case
[5] [6], the downlink multiuser case [7] [8] [9] [10] [11], multicell scenario [12], wireless power
transfer design [13], mobile edge computing [14], and cognitive radio system [15].
Recently, the IRS has emerged as a promising technology to enhance the physical layer security
in a wireless communication system. There are various schemes to improve the physical layer
security [16], such as the cooperative relaying [17], artificial noise (AN) [18], and cooperative
jamming [19]. By using these schemes, the AP-eavesdroppers links are impaired, and the in-
formation leakage to the eavesdroppers is limited. Combining with these schemes, the IRS can
further enhance the physical layer security. On one hand, deploying the IRS costs much less than
deploying the relay since no active radio frequency chain is required in IRS-aided systems. On the
other hand, the IRS can be programmed to configure the radio propagation environment to make
the impairment on the eavesdroppers’ channels more effective.
In terms of physical layer security enhancement, the IRS-aided secure communication has
received considerable attention from academia [20] [21] [22] [23]. In these contributions, the active
transmit beamforming and the passive reflecting beamforming of the IRS were jointly designed to
improve the achievable secrecy rate. It was demonstrated that it is preferable to deploy the IRS near
the legitimate receiver. The work in [21] assumed that the eavesdropper has a stronger channel
than the legitimate user and both channels are highly correlated, and it showed that deploying
an IRS can enhance the secrecy rate even in such a challenging scenario. Moreover, the AN is
3incorporated with transmit beamforming in IRS-aided wireless secure communications [24] [25].
The phase shift matrix at the IRS as well as the beamforming vectors and AN covariance matrix
at the base station (BS) were jointly optimized for maximizing the secrecy rate. It was unveiled
that it is beneficial for secrecy enhancement with the aid of AN.
We note that all these existing contributions are based on the ideal assumption of perfect channel
state information (CSI) of both the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper at the transmitters.
However, it is difficult to obtain the perfect CSI in IRS-aided wireless communication, because
the IRS does not employ any radio frequency (RF) chains. In IRS-aided communication systems,
it is challenging to estimate the IRS-related channel of the reflective AP-IRS-user link due to
the passive IRS, which thus attracted a lot of research attention. The current channel estimation
contributions for the IRS-related channels can be divided into two approaches. The first one is to
estimate AP-IRS channel and IRS-user channel separately [26]. As shown in [26], to estimate the
two separated IRS-related channels, active transmit radio RF chains are required to be installed at
the IRS. The drawback of this approach is that extra hardware and power consumption is required.
The second one is to estimate the cascaded AP-IRS-user channel, which is defined as the product
of the AP-IRS channel and the IRS-user channel [11] [20] [22] [27]. The benefit of this approach
is that the cascaded AP-IRS-user channel can be estimated without installing extra hardware and
incurring power cost, and that the estimated cascaded AP-IRS-user channel is sufficient for the
transmission beamforming design for the IRS-related links. Thus, more efforts are dedicated to the
cascaded channel estimation [28] [29] [30] [31]. The cascaded channel estimation methods were
investigated in a single-user multiple-input multiple-output (SU-MIMO) system [28] and a multi-
user multiple-input single-output (MU-MISO) system [29], respectively. Then, by exploiting the
channel sparsity of the mmWave channels, the compressive sensing methods were adopted to reduce
the pilot overhead in [30] and [31] for single-user and multi-user systems, respectively. However,
for both approaches, the channel estimation error is inevitable. Therefore, it is imperative to take the
channel estimation error into consideration when designing the IRS-aided communication systems.
There are a paucity of contributions investigating the robust transmission design in IRS-aided
communications. The work of [32] proposed a worst-case robust design algorithm in an MU-
MISO wireless system, where the IRS-user channels were assumed to be imperfect. In addition,
a worst-case robust design in IRS-assisted secure communications was investigated in [33], where
the IRS-eavesdropper channels were assumed to be imperfect. Both these works only considered
4the IRS-user CSI error based on the first IRS-related channel estimation approach. Since it is more
practical to consider the cascaded channel uncertainty based on the second IRS-related channel
estimation approach, Zhou et. al [34] firstly proposed a robust transmission framework with both
the bounded and the statistical cascaded CSI errors in an MU-MISO wireless system.
However, to the best of our knowledge, the robust transmission design with cascaded chan-
nel error in secure IRS-aided communication systems has not been studied yet. Moreover, the
probabilistic CSI error model has not been studied in secure IRS-aided communication systems.
To fill this gap, this paper investigates the outage constrained robust secure transmission for
IRS-aided secure wireless communication systems, where the statistical model of the cascaded
channel error is considered. Specifically, we consider a scenario that a multi-antenna AP serves a
single-antenna legitimate user in the presence of several single-antenna eavesdroppers. Moreover,
the AN is assumed to be injected to degrade the reception quality of eavesdroppers. In this
scenario, we consider an outage-constrained robust design aiming for minimizing the transmit
power by considering the imperfect CSI of the eavesdroppers’ channels with the outage constraints
of maximum information leakage to eavesdroppers and the constraint of minimum information
transmission to legitimate users. An outage-constrained power minimization (OC-PM) problem is
formulated to jointly optimize the beamforming vector, the AN covariance matrix, and the phase
shifts matrix of IRS while satisfying quality of service (QoS) requirements. Since the optimization
variables are highly coupled, an alternating optimization (AO) method is proposed to solve it.
The main contributions of this paper can be summarized as follows:
1) To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work to study the outage constrained robust
secure transmission for IRS-aided wireless communications. In contrast to [32] and [33] that
only considered the bounded CSI error model in secure IRS-aided wireless communications,
we first consider the statisitical CSI error model. In addition, the imperfect cascaded channels
of AP-eavesdropper are investigated in secure IRS-aided communications for the first time,
which is more practical compared to the existing literature considering the imperfect IRS-user
channels.
2) For the outage constrained robust secure transmission design, we formulate an OC-PM
problem to optimize the beamforming vector, the AN covariance matrix, and the phase
shifts matrix of IRS. To solve it, we first transform the probabilistic constraints into the
safe and tractable forms by exploiting Bernstein-type inequality (BTI) [35]. Then, the AO
5strategy is utilized to transform the original problems into two subproblems, where the designs
of beamforming vector, AN covariance matrix, and phase shifts of IRS are handled by
semidefinite relaxation (SDR) based methods. For the nonconvex unit modulus constraints
of IRS phase shifts, an equivalent rank-one constraint is incorporated, which is further
transformed by the first-order Taylor approximation and added into the objective function as
a penalty.
3) Simulation results demonstrate that the robust design of beamforming vector and AN co-
variance matrix in a secure IRS-aided communication system can reduce the transmit power
under the fixed secrecy rate. In comparison to various benchmark methods, the effectiveness
of the proposed AO algorithm is verified. Moreover, it is revealed that by deploying the IRS
and optimizing the IRS phase shifts, the reliable communication can be guaranteed for the
legitimate user, while the information leakage to eavesdropper can be limited. The physical
layer security can be significantly enhanced by the robust design in the secure IRS-aided
wireless communications.
Notations: Throughout this paper, boldface lower case, boldface upper case and regular letters
are used to denote vectors, matrices, and scalars, respectively. Tr (X) and |X| denote the trace
and determinant of X, respectively. CM×N denotes the space of M ×N complex matrices. Re{·}
denotes the real part of a complex value. diag(·) is the operator for diagonalization. 1M presents
a column vector with M ones. CN (µ,Z) represents a circularly symmetric complex gaussian
(CSCG) random vector with mean µ and covariance matrix Z. (·)T, (·)H and (·)∗ denote the
transpose, Hermitian and conjugate operators, respectively.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
In this section, we present the transmission model and CSI error model in a secure IRS-aided
communication system as follows.
A. Signal Transmission Model
An IRS-assisted communication system is considered, where an AP equipped with Nt antennas,
called Alice, intends to send confidential information to a single-antenna legitimate receiver, called
Bob, in the presence of K single-antenna eavesdroppers, called Eves.
As shown in Fig. 1, the signal transmitted from Alice is reflected by the IRS, which comprises
M reflecting elements. The direct links of Alice-Bob and Alice-Eve are blocked by obstacles such
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Fig. 1. An IRS-assisted secure communication system.
as buildings. The Bob and Eves can only receive the signals reflected by the IRS. The received
signals at Bob and Eves are respectively modeled as
yb(t) = hˆ
H
b x(t) + nb(t) = (h
H
rbΦGar)x(t) + nb(t), (1)
ye,k(t) = hˆ
H
e,kx(t) + ne,k(t) = (h
H
re,kΦGar)x(t) + ne,k(t), (2)
where hˆb = GHarΦ
Hhrb, hˆb ∈ CNt×1 is defined as the equivalent channel spanning from Alice to
Bob. The channels of the IRS-Bob link and the Alice-IRS link are modeled by hrb ∈ CM×1 and
Gar ∈ CM×Nt , respectively. hˆe,k = GHarΦHhre,k, hˆe,k ∈ CNt×1 is defined as the equivalent channel
spanning from Alice to the kth Eve. The channel of the IRS-Eve link is modeled by hre,k ∈ CM×1.
nb(t) is the additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) at Bob with zero mean and noise variance σ2b ,
i.e., nb ∼ CN (0, σ2b ). ne,k(t) is the AWGN at the kth Eve with zero mean and noise covariance
matrix σ2e,k, i.e., ne,k ∼ CN (0, σ2e,k). The phase shift coefficients of the IRS are collected in a
diagonal matrix defined by Φ = diag{φ1, · · · , φm, · · · , φM}, where φm =ejθm , and θm ∈ [0, 2pi]
denotes the phase shift of the m-th reflecting element.
The transmit signal vector is
x(t) = s(t) + z(t) = ws(t) + z(t), (3)
where s(t) is a data stream carrying the confidential information intended for Bob, z(t) is the
noise vector artificially created by Alice to interfere Eves, i.e., the so-called AN, and w is the
beamforming vector. The confidential signal vector s(t) is assumed to follow a complex Gaussian
distribution of CN (0,W), where W =wwH is the transmit covariance matrix to be designed. For
the AN, we assume z(t) ∼ CN (0,Z), where Z is the AN covariance matrix to be designed.
7The equivalent channel hˆb can be rewritten as
hˆHb = φ
Tdiag(hHrb)Gar , φTGcb, (4)
where φ = [φ1, · · · , φm, · · · , φM ]T and Gcb = diag(hHrb)Gar. Gcb ∈ CM×Nt is defined as the
cascaded channel from Alice to Bob via the IRS. Similarly, the equivalent channel hˆe,k can be
expressed in another way as
hˆHe,k = φ
Tdiag(hHre,k)Gar , φTGce,k, (5)
where Gce,k = diag(hHre,k)Gar, k = 1, 2, · · · , K. Gce,k ∈ CM×Nt denotes the cascaded channel
from Alice to the kth Eve via the IRS.
B. Statistical CSI Error Model
In IRS-aided communications, the cascaded AP-IRS-user channels at the transmitter is chal-
lenging to obtain due to the passive features of the IRS. Hence, we consider the CSI error in the
cascaded AP-IRS-user channels. Generally, there are two channel error models: the bounded CSI
error model and the statistical CSI error model. In this paper, we focus on the statistical CSI error
of the cascaded channel for Eves since the bounded CSI error is more conservative. Furthermore,
the statistical CSI error model is more closely related to the channel estimation error, while the
bounded CSI error usually models the quantization error.
We assume the cascaded channel Gce,k from Alice to the kth Eve is imperfect, which can be
represented as
Gce,k = G¯ce,k +4Gce,k,gce,k , vec(4Gce,k) ∼ CN (0,Σe,k), (6)
where the CSI error vector gce,k , vec(4Gce,k) is assumed to follow the CSCG distribution, and
Σe,k ∈ CMNt×MNt is the semidefinite error covariance matrix.
III. PROBLEM FORMULATION
In this section, we first derive the secrecy rate expression and then formulate the outage-
constrained power minimization problem.
8A. Secrecy Rate
The achievable data rate (bit/s/Hz) of Bob is given by
Cb(W,Z,Φ) = log
(
1 +
hˆHb Whˆb
σ2b + hˆ
H
b Zhˆb
)
= log
(
1 +
(φTGcb)W(φ
TGcb)
H
σ2b + (φ
TGcb)Z(φTGcb)H
)
, (7)
where the cascaded channel Gcb from Alice to Bob is utilized. The achievable data rate (bit/s/Hz)
of the kth Eve is given by
Ce,k(W,Z,Φ) = log
(
1 +
hˆHe,kWhˆe,k
σ2e,k + hˆ
H
e,kZhˆe,k
)
= log
(
1 +
(φTGce,k)W(φ
TGce,k)
H
σ2e,k + (φ
TGce,k)Z(φTGce,k)H
)
, (8)
where the cascaded channel Gce,k from Alice to the kth Eve is applied.
Then the achievable secrecy rate is
Rs(W,Z,Φ) = min
k=1,2,··· ,K
{Cb(W,Z,Φ)− Ce,k(W,Z,Φ)} . (9)
B. Power Minimization
In this paper, we aim to jointly optimize the transmit beamforming vector w (or the transmit
beamforming matrix W = wwH), the covariance matrix Z of AN and the IRS phase shifts Φ
to minimize the transmit power subject to the Bob’s data rate requirement and leaked data rate
outage for Eves. The OC-PM problem can be formulated as
min
W,Z,Φ
Tr(W+Z) (10a)
s.t. Cb(W,Z,Φ) ≥ log γ, (10b)
Prgce,k {Ce,k(W,Z,Φ) ≤ log β} ≥ 1− ρk, k = 1, 2, · · · , K, (10c)
Z  0, (10d)
W  0, (10e)
rank(W) = 1, (10f)
|φm| = 1,m = 1, · · · ,M, (10g)
where γ, β, and ρk,∀k are constant values, and (10c) can be seen as the constraints of per-Eve
secrecy outage probability.
9IV. PROBLEM SOLUTION
Due to the coupling relation of various optimization variables and the complicated probabilistic
constraints, the proposed OC-PM problem is nonconvex and challenging to solve. To tackle it, we
first transform the probabilistic constraints into the safe and tractable forms. Then, the AO strategy
is utilized to decouple the parameters and transform the original problems into two subproblems.
A. Problem Reformulation
We first reformulate the constraint in (10b). Specifically, it can be simplified by removing the
log function as
log
(
1 +
hˆHb Whˆb
σ2b + hˆ
H
b Zhˆb
)
≥ log γ (11a)
⇔Tr([W − (γ − 1)Z]hˆbhˆHb ) ≥ (γ − 1)σ2b , (11b)
⇔Tr([W − (γ − 1)Z](GHcbφ∗)(φTGcb)) ≥ (γ − 1)σ2b , (11c)
⇔Tr(Gcb[W − (γ − 1)Z]GHcbE) ≥ (γ − 1)σ2b , (11d)
where E , φ∗φT . Then, we reformulate the per-Eve outage probability constraint (10c), which is
not tractable to handle due to the log function and the probability requirement. We first eliminate
the log function, then transform the probability constraint into the deterministic constraint. There
are two steps to reformulate the chance constraint (10c) as follows.
Step 1): Firstly, the data rate leakage expression in (10c) can be simplifed as
log
(
1 +
hˆHe,kWhˆe,k
σ2e,k + hˆ
H
e,kZhˆe,k
)
≤ log β (12a)
⇔hˆHe,k[W − (β − 1)Z]hˆe,k ≤ (β − 1)σ2e,k. (12b)
By substituting hˆHe,k = φ
T (G¯ce,k +4Gce,k) into (12b) and defining Ξe , (β − 1)Z −W, we
have
(12a)⇔[φT (G¯ce,k +4Gce,k)]Ξe[φT (G¯ce,k +4Gce,k)]H + (β − 1)σ2e,k ≥ 0, (13a)
⇔φT4Gce,kΞe4GHce,kφ∗︸ ︷︷ ︸
f1
+ 2Re{φT4Gce,kΞeG¯Hce,kφ∗︸ ︷︷ ︸
f2
}
+ (φT G¯ce,k)Ξe(φ
T G¯ce,k)
H + (β − 1)σ2e,k︸ ︷︷ ︸
ck
≥ 0. (13b)
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Let us equivalently represent the CSI error gce,k = vec(4Gce,k) as gce,k = Σ1/2e,k vce,k, where
vce,k ∼ CN (0, IMNt), Σe,k = Σ1/2e,k Σ1/2e,k and (Σ1/2e,k )H = Σ1/2e,k . The expression f1 in (13b) can be
reformulated as
f1 = Tr(4Gce,kΞe4GHce,kφ∗φT )
= Tr(4GHce,kE4Gce,kΞe)
(a)
= vecH(4Gce,k)(ΞTe ⊗ E)vec(4Gce,k)
= gHce,k(Ξ
T
e ⊗ E)gce,k
= vHce,kΣ
1/2
e,k (Ξ
T
e ⊗ E)Σ1/2e,k vce,k
, vHce,kAkvce,k, (14)
where Ak , Σ1/2e,k (ΞTe ⊗E)Σ1/2e,k , and the (a) is obtained by invoking the identity Tr(AHBCD) =
vecH(A)(DT ⊗B)vec(C). The expression f2 in (13b) can be reformulated as
f2 = Tr(4Gce,kΞe(G¯Hce,kφ∗)φT )
= Tr(4Gce,kΞe(G¯Hce,kE))
(b)
= vecH(EG¯ce,k)(ΞTe ⊗ IM)vec(4Gce,k)
= vecH(EG¯ce,k)(ΞTe ⊗ IM)gce,k
= vecH(EG¯ce,k)(ΞTe ⊗ IM)Σ1/2e,k vce,k
, uHce,kvce,k, (15)
where uHce,k , vecH(EG¯ce,k)(ΞTe ⊗ IM)Σ1/2e,k , and the (b) is obtained by invoking the identity
Tr(ABCH) = vecH(C)(BT ⊗ I)vec(A). The expression ck in (13b) can be reformulated as
ck = Tr[G¯ce,kΞeG¯Hce,kE] + (β − 1)σ2e,k. (16)
By substituting (14), (15) and (16) into (13b), we have
(12a)⇔ vHce,kAkvce,k + 2Re{uHce,kvce,k}+ ck ≥ 0. (17)
The leakage data rate constraint in (10c) becomes
(10c)⇔Prvce,k
{
vHce,kAkvce,k + 2Re{uHce,kvce,k}+ ck ≥ 0
} ≥ 1− ρk, k = 1, 2, · · · , K. (18)
Step 2): the chance constraint is transformed into a deterministic constraint by using the BTI,
which provides a safe approximation for (18).
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The equivalence in (18) implies that the outage probability in (10c) can be characterized by
the quadratic inequality with respect to (w.r.t.) the Gaussian random vector vce,k. Generally, the
Bernstein-type inequality is utilized to approximate a chance constraint safely, which is given in
the following Lemma.
Lemma 1:
(Bernstein-Type Inequality) For any (A,u, c) ∈ Hn×Cn×R,v ∼ CN (0, In) and ρ ∈ (0,1], the
following implication holds:
Prv
{
vHAv + 2Re{uHv}+ c ≥ 0} ≥ 1− ρ
⇐⇒Tr(A)−
√
2 ln(1/ρ)
√
‖A‖2F + 2 ‖u‖2 + ln(ρ) · λ+(−A) + c ≥ 0,
⇐⇒

Tr(A)−√−2 ln(ρ) · x+ ln(ρ) · y + c ≥ 0,∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
 vec(A),√
2u

∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
2
≤ x,
yIn + A  0, y ≥ 0,
where λ+(A) = max(λmax(A), 0). x and y are slack variables.
By invoking Lemma 1 and introducing the slack variables x = [x1, x2, · · · , xK ]T and y =
[y1, y2, · · · , yK ]T , we arrive at the desired safe approximation of OC-PM, which is shown as
min
W,Z,φ,A,x,y
Tr(W+Z) (19a)
s.t. Tr(Ak)−
√
−2 ln(ρk) · xk + ln(ρk) · yk + ck ≥ 0, (19b)∥∥∥∥∥∥
 vec(Ak)√
2uce,k
∥∥∥∥∥∥
2
≤ xk, (19c)
ykIMNt + Ak  0, yk ≥ 0, (19d)
Tr(Gcb[W − (γ − 1)Z]GHcbE) ≥ (γ − 1)σ2b , (19e)
(10d), (10e), (10f), (10g), (19f)
where A = [A1,A2, · · · ,AK ]. The constraint (19e) is obtained by substituting (11d) into (10b).
The constraints (19b), (19c) and (19d) can be further simplified by some mathematical transfor-
mations as follows.
The Tr(Ak) in (19b) can be rewritten as
Tr(Ak) = Tr(Σ
1/2
e,k (Ξ
T
e ⊗ E)Σ1/2e,k ) = Tr((ΞTe ⊗ E)Σe,k). (20)
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The ‖vec(Ak)‖22 in (19c) can be written as
‖vec(Ak)‖22 = ‖Ak‖2F = Tr[AkAHk ] = Tr[Σ1/2e,k (ΞTe ⊗ E)Σ1/2e,k Σ1/2e,k (Ξ∗e ⊗ EH)Σ1/2e,k ]
= Tr[(ΞTe ⊗ E)HΣe,k(ΞTe ⊗ E)Σe,k]
(c)
= vecH(ΞTe ⊗ E)(ΣTe,k ⊗Σe,k)vec(ΞTe ⊗ E)
= vecH(ΞTe ⊗ E)[(Σ1/2Te,k Σ1/2Te,k )⊗ (Σ1/2e,k Σ1/2e,k )]vec(ΞTe ⊗ E)
= vecH(ΞTe ⊗ E)[(Σ1/2Te,k ⊗Σ1/2e,k )H(Σ1/2Te,k ⊗Σ1/2e,k )]vec(ΞTe ⊗ E)
=
∥∥∥(Σ1/2Te,k ⊗Σ1/2e,k )vec(ΞTe ⊗ E)∥∥∥2
2
, (21)
where the (c) is obtained by invoking the identity Tr(AHBCD) = vecH(A)(DT ⊗B)vec(C).
The ‖uce,k‖22 in (19c) can be written as
‖uce,k‖22 = uHce,kuce,k
= vecH(EG¯ce,k)(ΞTe ⊗ IM)Σ1/2e,k Σ1/2e,k (Ξ∗e ⊗ IM)vec(EG¯ce,k)
=
∥∥∥Σ1/2e,k (ΞTe ⊗ IM)vec(EG¯ce,k)∥∥∥2
2
. (22)
The constraint ykIn + Ak  0, yk ≥ 0 in (19d) can be written as
ykINtM + Σ
1/2
e,k (Ξ
T
e ⊗ E)Σ1/2e,k  0, yk ≥ 0. (23)
Finally, by substituting (20), (21), (22) and (23) into (19), the OC-PM Problem can be recast as
min
W,Z,φ,x,y
Tr(W+Z) (24a)
s.t. Tr((ΞTe ⊗ E)Σe,k)−
√
−2 ln(ρk) · xk + ln(ρk) · yk
+ Tr[G¯ce,kΞeG¯Hce,kE] + (β − 1)σ2e,k ≥ 0, (24b)∥∥∥∥∥∥
 (Σ1/2Te,k ⊗Σ1/2e,k )vec(ΞTe ⊗ E)√
2Σ
1/2
e,k (Ξ
T
e ⊗ IM)vec(EG¯ce,k)
∥∥∥∥∥∥
2
≤ xk, (24c)
ykINtM + Σ
1/2
e,k (Ξ
T
e ⊗ E)Σ1/2e,k  0, yk ≥ 0, (24d)
(19e), (10d), (10e), (10f), (10g). (24e)
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B. Solving the Beamforming Matrix and AN Covariance Matrix
Problem (24) is not convex due to the coupled Ξe and φ. To solve it, we use the AO method
to update {W,Z,x,y} and φ iteratively. Specifically, when φ is fixed, Problem (24) becomes
convex for {W,Z,x,y} if the rank one constraint in (10f) is relaxed. By the SDR technique, the
problem of optimizing {W,Z,x,y} becomes
min
W,Z,x,y
Tr(W+Z) (25a)
s.t. Tr((ΞTe ⊗ E)Σe,k)−
√
−2 ln(ρk) · xk + ln(ρk) · yk
+ Tr[G¯ce,kΞeG¯Hce,kE] + (β − 1)σ2e,k ≥ 0, (25b)∥∥∥∥∥∥
 (Σ1/2Te,k ⊗Σ1/2e,k )vec(ΞTe ⊗ E)√
2Σ
1/2
e,k (Ξ
T
e ⊗ IM)vec(EG¯ce,k)
∥∥∥∥∥∥
2
≤ xk, (25c)
ykINtM + Σ
1/2
e,k (Ξ
T
e ⊗ E)Σ1/2e,k  0, yk ≥ 0, (25d)
(19e), (10d), (10e). (25e)
Problem (25) is convex, and can be solved by the CVX toolbox. Due to the SDR, the obtained
W of Problem (25) may not be a rank-one solution. If not, the suboptimal beamforming vector
can be obtained by using the Gaussian randomization method. Numerical simulations show that
the obtained W always satisfies the rank-one constraint. Thus, the beamforming vector w can be
obtained from the eigen-decomposition of W.
C. Solving the Phase Shifts of IRS
When {W,Z,x,y} are fixed, Problem (24) becomes a feasibility check problem. In order to
improve the converged solution in the optimization process, the data rate inequalities for Bob in
(11d) and Eve in (13a) are rewritten by introducing slack variables, and recast respectively as
Tr(Gcb[W − (γ − 1)Z]GHcbE) ≥ (γ − 1)σ2b + δ0, δ0 ≥ 0, (26a)
[φT (G¯ce,k +4Gce,k)]Ξe[φT (G¯ce,k +4Gce,k)]H + (β − 1)σ2e,k + δk ≥ 0, δk ≥ 0. (26b)
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Then by fixing W and Z obtained in the previous iteration, and using the BTI for the outage
of leaked data rate again, the optimization problem for φ becomes
max
φ,δ,x,y
‖δ‖1 (27a)
s.t. Tr((ΞTe ⊗ E)Σe,k)−
√
−2 ln(ρk) · xk + ln(ρk) · yk
+ Tr[G¯ce,kΞeG¯Hce,kE] + (β − 1)σ2e,k + δk ≥ 0, (27b)∥∥∥∥∥∥
 (Σ1/2Te,k ⊗Σ1/2e,k )vec(ΞTe ⊗ E)√
2Σ
1/2
e,k (Ξ
T
e ⊗ IM)vec(EG¯ce,k)
∥∥∥∥∥∥
2
≤ xk, (27c)
ykINtM + Σ
1/2
e,k (Ξ
T
e ⊗ E)Σ1/2e,k  0, yk ≥ 0, (27d)
Tr(Gcb[W − (γ − 1)Z]GHcbE) ≥ (γ − 1)σ2b + δ0, (27e)
δ  0, (27f)
(10g), (27g)
where δ = [δ0, δ1, δ2, · · · , δK ]T . Then, the only nonconvex constraint in Problem (27) is the unit-
modulus constraint (10g). There is no general approach to solve unit modulus constrained non-
convex optimization problems optimally. To deal with it, the semidefinite programming (SDP)
method is utilized. To facilitate SDP, Problem (27) is recast as
max
E,δ,x,y
‖δ‖1 (28a)
s.t. (27b), (27c), (27d), (27e), (27f) (28b)
Diag(E) = 1M , (28c)
E  0, (28d)
rank(E) = 1, (28e)
where the constraints (28c), (28d) and (28e) are equivalent to the constraint (10g), and they are
imposed to ensure that the phase shifts vector φ with unit modulus can be recovered from E. The
Problem (28) is convex except the nonconvex constraint (28e). Although the SDR method can be
used to solve Problem (28) by removing constraint (28e) and solving the resulted SDP problem,
the rank of solved E is generally larger than one. To handle this problem, we construct a convex
constraint equivalent to the rank one constraint (28e), and the following Lemma is utilized.
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Lemma 2: For any positive semidefinite matrix A, the following inequality holds
|I + A| ≥ 1 + Tr(A), (29)
and the equality in (29) holds if and only if rank(A) ≤ 1. Proof : Let rA = rank(A). Since rA = 0
is trivial, the nonzero eigenvalues of A are denoted by λ1 ≥ λ2 ≥ · · · ≥ λrA > 0. Then we have
|I + A| =
rA∏
i=1
(1 + λi) = 1 +
rA∑
i=1
λi +
∑
i 6=k
λiλk + · · ·
≥ 1 +
rA∑
i=1
λi = 1 + Tr(A). (30)
It can be seen from (30) that the equality holds if and only if rank(A) = 1.
By invoking Lemma 2, we can build an equivalent constraint as
(28e)⇔|I + E| ≤ 1 + Tr(E), (31a)
⇔ log det(I + E) ≤ log(1 +M), (31b)
where Tr(E) = M . The constraint (31b) ensures the rank one equality, thus is equivalent to
constraint (28e). By utilizing the penalty-based method and putting the constraint (31b) into the
objective function (OF) of Problem (28), Problem (28) can be cast as
max
E,δ,x,y
‖δ‖1 + κ[log(1 +M)− log det(I + E)] (32a)
s.t. (27b), (27c), (27d), (27e), (27f), (28c), (28d), (32b)
where κ is a penalty factor penalizing the violation of constraint rank(E) = 1. Since the log det(I+
E) is a concave function with respect to E, the upper bound of it can be obtained by using the
first-order Taylor approximation as
log det(I + E) ≤(log e)Tr{((I + E(n))−1)∗(E− E(n))}+ (log e) log det(I + E(n)), (33)
where e denotes natural logarithm, and the ∂ ln(|det(X)|)
∂X
= (X−1)T is utilized. By substituting (33)
into the OF of Problem (32) and removing the constant terms, Problem (32) can be written as
max
E,δ,x,y
‖δ‖1 + κ[−(log e)Tr{((I + E(n))−1)∗(E− E(n))}] (34a)
s.t. (27b), (27c), (27d), (27e), (27f), (28c), (28d). (34b)
Problem (34) is jointly convex with respect to {E, δ,x,y}, hence it can be efficiently solved by
standard convex program solvers such as CVX. A rank-one solution E? can be obtained by solving
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Algorithm 1 Alternating Optimization Algorithm
1: Parameter Setting: Set the maximum number of iterations nmax and the first iterative number
n = 1; Give the penalty factor κ and error tolerance ε;
2: Initialize the variables w(1), Z(1) and φ(1) in the feasible region; Compute the OF value of
Problem (24) as OF(w(1),Z(1));
3: Solve Problem (25) to obtain the w(n),Z(n) by fixing φ(n−1); Calculate the OF value of Problem
(25) as OF(w(n),Z(n));
4: Solve Problem (34) to obtain the φ(n) by fixing w(n),Z(n);
5: If
∣∣OF(w(n),Z(n))−OF(w(n−1),Z(n−1))∣∣/OF(w(n−1),Z(n−1))< ε or n ≥ nmax, terminate. Otherwise,
update n← n+ 1 and jump to Step 3.
Problem (34) for a sufficiently small value of penalty factor κ. The maximum value of Problem
(34) serves as the lower bound for the optimal value of Problem (32). The overall AO algorithm
proposed is summarized in Algorithm 1. By iteratively solving Problem (25) and Problem (34)
optimally in Step 3 and Step 4 in Algorithm 1, the transmit power can be monotonically reduced
with guaranteed convergence.
V. SIMULATION RESULTS
A. Simulation Setup
One appealing benefit of deploying an IRS in secure wireless systems is to establish favorable
communication links for legitimate user that is blocked by obstacles. We consider a scenario where
the direct links from the AP to the legitimate user and evesdroppers are blocked. The simulated
system model is shown in Fig. 2. The Alice is located at (0,10) m. The IRS is installed at a height
of 25 m. The Bob and Eves can be randomly distributed on the x axis.
The channel matrix between the Alice and the IRS is modeled as Gar ∈ CM×Nt , which is
GTar =
√
L0d−αarar
(√
βar
1 + βar
GLOSar +
√
1
1 + βar
GNLOSar
)
, (35)
where L0 =
(
λc
4pi
)2 is a constant with λc being the wavelength of the center frequency of the
information carrier. The distance between the AP and the IRS is denoted by dar, while αar denotes
the corresponding path loss exponent. The small-scale fading is assumed to be Ricean fading with
Ricean factor βar. The GLOSar denotes the light of sight (LoS) component of the Alice-IRS channel.
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Fig. 2. The simulated secure communication scenario
By assuming that the antennas at the Alice and the passive reflecting elements at the IRS are both
arranged in a uniform linear array (ULA), the GLOSar can be modeled as G
LOS
ar = cd
H , where
c = [c1, c2, · · · , cNt ]T denotes the transmit steering vector of the Alice, and d = [d1, d2, · · · , dM ]T
denotes the receive steering vector of the IRS. The mth elements of c and d are written as
cm = exp(j2pi
da
λc
(m− 1) sin θa), (36a)
dm = exp(j2pi
dr
λc
(m− 1) sin θr), (36b)
where da and dr are respectively the element intervals at Alice and the IRS; θa represents the
elevation angle of the LoS link from Alice; θr represents the elevation angle of the LoS link to
the IRS. We set da
λc
= dr
λc
= 0.5, θa = tan−1( yr−yaxr−xa ), and θr = pi− θa. GNLOSar denotes the non-LoS
(NLoS) component of the Alice-IRS channel, which is modeled as Rayleigh fading. The channels
of the IRS-Bob link and IRS-Eve link are modeled similarly, where both the LoS component and
NLoS component exist simultaneously.
For the statistical cascaded CSI error model, the variance matrix of gce,k = vec(4Gce,k) is
defined as Σe,k = ε2g,kI, where ε
2
g,k = δ
2
g,k
∥∥vec(G¯ce,k)∥∥22. δ2g,k ∈ [0, 1) is the normalized CSI
error, which measures the relative amount of CSI uncertainties. The system parameters used in the
following simulations are listed in Table I.
B. Benchmark Schemes
We demonstrate the advantage of the proposed AO algorithm by comparing its performance
with the following benchmark schemes:
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TABLE I
SIMULATION PARAMETERS
Carrier center frequency 2.4GHz
Path loss exponents for Alice-IRS channels αar , IRS-Bob
channels αrb, IRS-Eve channels αre,
2
Rician factor for Alice-IRS channel, βar 5
Rician factor for IRS-Bob channel, βrb 5
Rician factor for IRS-Eve channel, βre 5
Noise power at Bob and Eves, σ2b , σ
2
e,k -75dBm
Penalty factor, κ 5× 10−8
Convergence tolerance, ε 10−3
Outage probability, ρk 0.05
• Random-MRT: It performs maximum ratio transmission (MRT) based beamforming design,
i.e., w =
√
pw
hˆb
‖hˆb‖ =
√
pw
GHarΦ
Hhrb
‖hˆb‖ , where pw is the power allocated to legitimate user Bob.
It applies an isotropic AN [36], i.e., the AN covariance matrix is chosen as Z = pzP⊥hˆb , where
P⊥
hˆb
= INt − hˆbhˆHb /
∥∥∥hˆb∥∥∥2 is the orthogonal complement projector of hˆb, and pz is the power
invested on AN. Both the beamforming precoder w and the AN covariance matrix Z rely on
the phase shifts Φ of IRS. For Random-MRT schemes, we assume the phase shifts Φ of IRS
is randomly chosen. The allocated power pw to beamforming and the allocated power pz to
AN are optimized to satisfy the secrecy constraints in Problem (25).
• Optimized-MRT: Based on the MRT beamforming and isotropic AN, the phase shifts Φ of
IRS is obtained by using the proposed method. The allocated power pw to beamforming and
the allocated power pz to AN are optimized to satisfy the secrecy constraints in Problem (25).
• Random-IRS: It does not optimize the phase shifts of IRS, and the phase shifts of IRS Φ is
randomly selected. The beamforming matrix W and AN covariance matrix Z are optimized
by solving Problem (25).
The Random-MRT and Optimized-MRT schemes only exploit the CSI of Bob by assuming that the
CSI of Eves is unknown, while the Random-IRS scheme and the proposed algorithm exploit the
CSI of both Bob and Eves to realize robust transmission design. The Optimized-MRT is compared
with the Random-MRT to demonstrate the importance of the optimization of IRS phase shifts.
For Random-IRS scheme, the phase shifts of IRS Φ are not optimized, and only the beamforming
matrix W and AN covariance matrix Z are optimized robustly, while the proposed algorithm
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Fig. 3. Convergence of the proposed algorithm with log γ = 3 bit/s/Hz and log β = 1 bit/s/Hz, K = 2, δ2g,k = 0.0001, ∀k. The
location of AP is (0, 10) m, the location of IRS is (100, 25) m, the location of Bob is (180, 0) m, and the locations of Eves are
(160, 0) m and (170, 0) m.
optimizes these variables jointly. By comparing the proposed algorithm with the Random-IRS
scheme, the importance of the optimization of the IRS phase shifts in robust transmission design
is verified.
C. Convergence Analysis
The convergence of the proposed method with different antenna numbers of transmitter and
different numbers of IRS phase shifts are investigated in Fig. 3. As observed from Fig. 3(a),
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TABLE II
TIME COST
Versus Average CPU time (secs) in Fig. 3(a)
M M = 3 M = 4 M = 5 M = 6 M = 7 M = 8 M = 9
Nt = 3 2.0932 2.9118 6.5124 9.4720 13.1437 18.5433 20.9004
Versus Average CPU time (secs) in Fig. 3(b)
Nt Nt = 3 Nt = 4 Nt = 5 Nt = 6 Nt = 7 Nt = 8 Nt = 9
M = 3 1.6999 1.7960 1.9247 1.9806 2.2405 2.3101 2.7319
Versus Average CPU time (secs) in Fig. 4(a)
logγ (bit/s/Hz) logγ=5.5 logγ=5 logγ=4.5 logγ=4 logγ=3.5 logγ=3 logγ=2.5
logβ=2 (bit/s/Hz) 25.7724 26.7880 29.8244 36.3530 44.6590 67.7409 97.2034
Versus CPU time (secs) in Fig. 4(b)
logβ (bit/s/Hz) logβ=1.5 logβ=2 logβ=2.5 logβ=3 logβ=3.5 logβ=4 logβ=4.5
logγ=4.7 (bit/s/Hz) 24.4419 28.2168 30.1735 37.1616 48.4290 66.7990 90.5877
the proposed algorithm is likely to converge with fewer iterations when the number of transmit
antennas increases. With increased Nt, the dimension of optimization variables W and Z in the
CVX problem of each iteration becomes large, which requires more computation time for each
iteration. Thus, the computation time consumed by the proposed algorithm with a larger Nt still
increases even with fewer iterations. Fig. 3(b) shows the convergence of the proposed algorithm
with different values of M . It is seen that the proposed algorithm is likely to converge with more
iterations when the number of IRS elements increases. Since the quality of the cascaded channel
relies on the phase shifts of the IRS, larger M will bring more degrees of freedom to adjust the
cascaded channel, thus more iterations are required for the fine adjustment. With increased M , the
dimension of the optimization variable Φ in the CVX problem of each iteration becomes large, thus
the computation time of the proposed algorithm increases with M . The average central processing
unit (CPU) running time of the proposed algorithm versus Nt and M with the parameters in Fig.
3(a) and Fig. 3(b) is shown in Table II. The data is obtained by using a computer with a 3.40GHz
i7-6700 CPU and 16GB RAM. It is observed from Table II that the average CPU running time
required by our proposed algorithm increases with either Nt or M . The average CPU time increases
with Nt less slowly than with M , this is because the required iterations decrease with Nt. The
convergence of the proposed algorithm for different values of log γ and log β is shown in Fig. 4.
It is demonstrated that more iterations are required by decreasing the minimum channel capacity
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Fig. 4. Convergence of the proposed algorithm with Nt =M = 6, K = 2, δ2g,k = 0.0001, ∀k. The location of AP is (0, 10) m,
the location of IRS is (50, 25) m, the location of Bob is (180, 0) m, and the locations of Eves are (20, 0) m and (10, 0) m.
log γ of the legitimate user and increasing the maximum tolerable channel capacity log β of the
eavesdroppers. Since the dimension of the CVX problem in each iteration is not changed with
different log γ and log β, more iterations in Fig. 4 signify more computation time. The average
CPU running time of the proposed algorithm versus log γ and log β with the parameters in Fig.
4(a) and Fig. 4(b) is shown in Table II. It is found in Table II that more CPU time is required for
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the small value of secrecy rate.
D. Transmit Power Versus the Minimum Channel Capacity of the Legitimate User
In Fig. 5, we show the transmit power versus the minimum channel capacity log γ of the
legitimate user, while limiting the information leakage to the potential eavesdroppers as log β = 2
bit/s/Hz. From Fig. 5, we find that the transmit power increases monotonically with the minimum
channel capacity of the Bob. This is because more transmit power is required to satisfy the increased
data rate of Bob. By comparing our proposed method with the other benchmark schemes, it is
seen that the power budget of the proposed method is lower than the other benchmark schemes.
In particular, the MRT schemes only exploit the channel information of Bob, thus their power
consumptions stay at a high level. The optimized MRT scheme is better than the random MRT
scheme, because the IRS-relied cascaded channel has been greatly improved by optimizing the
phase shifts of IRS. The Random-IRS scheme consumes more power than the proposed method,
which demonstrates the necessity of optimizing the phase shifts of IRS. Fig. 5 reveals that the
security communication in LoS blocked environment can be realized by deploying an IRS, and
the phase shifts of IRS should be optimized.
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Fig. 5. Transmit power versus the minimum channel capacity log γ of the legitimate user with Nt = M = 6, K = 2, and
δ2g,k = 0.0001, ∀k. The location of AP is (0, 10) m, the location of IRS is (50, 25) m, the location of Bob is (180, 0) m, and the
locations of Eves are (20, 0) m and (10, 0) m.
The percentage of AN power in the total transmit power versus the minimum channel capacity
log γ of the legitimate user is shown in Fig. 6. When log γ is small, a small portion of transmit
power is allocated to transmit AN to deteriorate the achievable rates of Eves. When log γ increases,
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more transmit power should be emitted, thus the data rates of both Bob and Eve increase. To control
the data rates of Eves under the threshold log β, more AN power should be emitted to interfere
the Eves. By comparing the proposed method with the other benchmark schemes, we find that
the Optimized-MRT and Random-MRT schemes have much higher AN power percentage than the
proposed method and the Random-IRS scheme. By optimizing the IRS phase shifts, the AN power
percentage of the proposed method further reduces compared with the Random-IRS scheme.
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Fig. 6. Percentage of AN power versus the minimum channel capacity log γ of the legitimate user with Nt = M = 6, K = 2,
and δ2g,k = 0.0001, ∀k. The location of AP is (0, 10) m, the location of IRS is (50, 25) m, the location of Bob is (180, 0) m, and
the locations of Eves are (20, 0) m and (10, 0) m.
E. Transmit Power Versus the Maximum Tolerable Channel Capacity of the Eavesdroppers
Fig. 7 depicts the transmit power versus the maximum tolerable channel capacity log β of the
Eves by assuming that the minimum channel capacity of the legitimate user is log γ=4.7 bit/s/Hz.
As shown in Fig. 7, when log β becomes large, more information leakage is allowed for the Eves,
and less AN noise power is required. Thus the transmit power decreases versus the increased
maximum tolerable channel capacity log β of Eves. When log β becomes larger, the consumed
transmit power of the Random-MRT scheme approaches that of the Random-IRS scheme, while
the consumed transmit power of the Optimized-MRT scheme approaches that of the proposed
algorithm. This is because, when more information leakage to Eves is allowed, the importance
of robust transmission design by exploiting the Eves’ CSI is weakened. By comparing with other
benchmark schemes, the proposed method consumes the lowest transmit power, which confirms
the effectiveness of the proposed algorithm.
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Fig. 7. Transmit power versus the maximum tolerable channel capacity log β of the eavesdropper with Nt =M = 6, K = 2 and
δ2g,k = 0.0001, ∀k. The location of AP is (0, 10) m, the location of IRS is (50, 25) m, the location of Bob is (180, 0) m, and the
locations of Eves are (20, 0) m and (10, 0) m.
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Fig. 8. Percentage of AN power versus the maximum channel capacity log β of the eavesdropper with Nt =M = 6, K = 2 and
δ2g,k = 0.0001, ∀k. The location of AP is (0, 10) m, the location of IRS is (50, 25) m, the location of Bob is (180, 0) m, and the
locations of Eves are (20, 0) m and (10, 0) m.
The percentage of AN power in the total transmit power versus the maximum tolerable channel
capacity log β of the Eves is depicted in Fig. 8. When log β becomes large, the percentages of AN
power for all methods reduce. It is shown that when log β is small, a large portion of the transmit
power is allocated to transmit AN to deteriorate the achievable rates of the potential eavesdroppers,
and therefore, there is less power transmitted for legitimate user. As log β increases, the constraints
on the performance of the Eves are relaxed, and more transmit power is allocated to beamform to
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Bob. The percentages of AN power of both Random-MRT and Optimized MRT schemes are higher
than those of the Random-IRS and the proposed method. This is because the channel information
of Eves is not utilized for the MRT schemes. The percentage of AN power for the proposed method
is the lowest, which demonstrates the effectiveness of the robust transmission design.
F. Transmit Power Versus the Number of IRS Elements
We further examine the minimum transmit power consumption versus different numbers of IRS
elements in Fig. 9. The maximum tolerable channel capacity of the Eves is log β = 1 bit/s/Hz. The
required minimum data rate for the Bob is set as log γ = 3 bit/s/Hz. The transmit power is reduced
when the IRS element number M increases. To enhance the security, the phase shifts of the IRS
can be optimized to help the data transmission for Bob while degrade the data transmission for
Eves. A large value of M will bring more degrees of freedom to adjust the cascaded channels,
thus less transmit power is required to guarantee the data transmission for Bob and impair the
data transmission for Eves. The transmit power of the Optimized-MRT scheme and the proposed
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Fig. 9. Transmit power versus the IRS element number M with Nt = 3, K = 2, δ2g,k = 0.0001, ∀k, log β = 1 bit/s/Hz and
log γ = 3 bit/s/Hz. The location of AP is (0, 10) m, the location of IRS is (100, 25) m, the location of Bob is (180, 0) m, and the
locations of Eves are (160, 0) m and (170, 0) m.
algorithm decreases more quickly than that of the Random-MRT scheme and Random-IRS scheme,
which shows that optimizing the phase shifts of IRS can reduce the transmit power effectively.
The transmit power of the Random-MRT and Random-IRS schemes decreases slowly when M is
large, which shows that the transmit power cannot be effectively reduced without IRS phase shift
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optimization. Compared with the other benchmark schemes, the proposed algorithm requires the
lowest transmit power, which validates the superiority of the proposed algorithm.
G. Transmit Power Versus the Number of Transmit Antennas
We further examine the transmit power consumption versus different number of transmit antennas
Nt in Fig. 10. The maximum tolerable channel capacity of the Eves is log β = 1 bit/s/Hz. The
required minimum data rate for the Bob is set as log γ = 3 bit/s/Hz. Fig. 10 shows that the transmit
power of all schemes reduces when the number of transmit antennas increases. A large value of
Nt helps improve the channels for both the Bob and Eves. Then, the robust beamforming design
for Bob and AN design for Eves are easier to achieve with a larger Nt. Thus, the required transmit
power reduces with increased Nt. Compared with the Random-MRT scheme and Optimized-MRT
scheme, the required transmit power of the Random-IRS scheme and proposed algorithm decreases
more quickly with Nt. This is because, the MRT schemes do not exploit the Eves’ CSI, while
the Random-IRS scheme and the proposed algorithm exploit the Eve’s CSI robustly. The required
transmit power of Random-IRS scheme is further reduced by the proposed algorithm, which validate
the effectiveness of the proposed robust transmission design.
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Fig. 10. Transmit power versus transmit antenna number Nt with M = 3, K = 2, δ2g,k = 0.0001, ∀k, log β = 1 bit/s/Hz and
log γ = 3 bit/s/Hz. The location of AP is (0, 10) m, the location of IRS is (100, 25) m, the location of Bob is (180, 0) m, and the
locations of Eves are (160, 0) m and (170, 0) m.
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H. Transmit Power Versus CSI Uncertainty
Fig. 11 shows the transmit power versus the normalized CSI error variance δ2, where the
normalized CSI errors of different eavesdroppers are assumed to be identical, i.e., δg,k = δ, ∀k. As
can be observed, for the proposed scheme and the other benchmark schemes, the transmit power
increases as the quality of the CSI degrades. When the CSI errors of Eves’ channels increase,
more AN power is required to interfere Eves for information leakage limitation, thus the allocated
power for beamforming must also increase to guarantee Bob’s data requirement. This leads to the
increase of total transmit power with deteriorating channel. In comparison to other three benchmark
schemes, the required transmit power of the proposed method has been significantly reduced. Both
the Random MRT and Optimized MRT schemes need much more transmit power to impair the Eves,
which shows that the utilization of Eves’ CSI can help reduce the transmit power. The Random
IRS scheme also needs much more transmit power than the proposed method, which indicates
the effectiveness of the optimization on the IRS phase shifts in the robust transmission design.
It can also be found from Fig. 11 that the transmit power of the Random MRT and Optimized
MRT schemes increases more quickly than the proposed method, which shows that they are more
sensitive to the CSI errors, and that the proposed method is more robust with respect to the CSI
error.
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Fig. 11. Transmit power versus normalized CSI error variance δ2 with Nt = M = 6, K = 2, log β = 1 bit/s/Hz and log γ = 3
bit/s/Hz. The location of AP is (0, 10) m, the location of IRS is (100, 25) m, the location of Bob is (180, 0) m, and the locations
of Eves are (160, 0) m and (170, 0) m.
Fig. 12 gives the percentage of AN power in the total transmit power versus the normalized
CSI error variance δ2. It is shown in Fig. 12 that the percentage of AN power increases with CSI
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Fig. 12. Percentage of AN power versus normalized CSI error variance δ2 with Nt = M = 6, K = 2, log β = 1 bit/s/Hz and
log γ = 3 bit/s/Hz. The location of AP is (0, 10) m, the location of IRS is (100, 25) m, the location of Bob is (180, 0) m, and the
locations of Eves are (160, 0) m and (170, 0) m.
estimation error. When the quality of the CSI degrades, more AN power is required to interfere
the eavesdroppers. The percentages of AN power in the total transmit power for the Optimized
MRT and Random MRT schemes are more than 70%, while the percentages of AN power in the
total transmit power for the proposed method and Random IRS scheme are less than 20%. Without
the Eves’s CSI, more AN power is required to impair the Eves. On the contrary, by exploiting the
Eves’ CSI robustly, the AN interference becomes more effective, thus less percentage of AN power
is required. Compared with the Random IRS scheme, less AN power percentage is required for
the proposed method, which demonstrates that the optimization of IRS phase shifts helps impair
the Eves’ channel, thus makes less AN power interferes the Eves more effectively.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we designed the outage constrained robust transmission in the secure IRS-aided
wireless communications. The statistical CSI error of cascaded IRS channel was taken into con-
sideration for the first time in secure communications, and the OC-PM problem was formulated to
minimize the transmit power by jointly optimizing the transmit beamforming vector, AN covariance,
and IRS phase shifts. To solve it, an AO based method was proposed, where the optimization
variables are optimized alternately. The BTI was utilized to tackle the chance constraint. The SDR
scheme was utilized when designing the beamforming vector and IRS phase shifts. Specifically,
the nonconvex unit modulus constrained was handled by a penalty method. Simulation results have
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verified the effectiveness of IRS on enhancing the physical layer security of wireless communi-
cations. The robustness of the proposed method has also been confirmed when the statistical CSI
error exists, which is meaningful. The superiority of the proposed method over the benchmark
methods has also been validated.
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